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This paper uses an experimental-economics technique to measure the potential impact of 
introducing quality certification to the market for infant foods in Mali, where malnutrition is 
widespread.  We find that certification could substantially lower food costs, generating a total net 
economic benefit on the order of US$1 million annually, or approximately US$20 per infant, per 
year. The study shows that mothers’ demand for quality information rises with their education 
and income level, but is higher than the estimated cost of certification even among the very poor 
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In the developing world, an estimated 33% of preschool children are stunted, and over 
half of child deaths are associated with malnutrition (UN and IFPRI 2000).  Nutritional deficits 
are most severe between six months and two years of age (Martorell and Habicht 1986, Lutter 
2000), in part due to the difficulty of the transition from breastmilk to a family diet, when foods 
of exceptionally high density must be introduced for children to obtain adequate nutrition from 
their limited digestive capacity (Brown et al. 1998).
2 
The high-density food products needed to complement breast-milk are relatively more 
difficult to produce than the foods normally used in a family diet.  Home preparation is laborious 
and requires appropriate ingredients (Bauer et al. 1997, Onofiok and Nnanyelugo 1998).  Public 
health authorities have succeeded in producing industrially-processed products at relatively low 
cost (Lutter and Huffman 2000), and when these foods are given to children in nutritional trials 
or feeding programs they improve child health significantly and generate lifelong benefits 
(Martorell 1995, Caulfield, Huffman and Piwoz 1999).  But such low-cost infant foods attract 
little effective demand in the marketplace, and their introduction has had limited impact on the 
children at greatest risk (UN and IFPRI 2000).  Even in the poorest countries, commercial 
markets remain dominated by heavily-advertised brands such as Nestlé’s Cérélac, which sell at 
prices far above the cost of production (Dijkuizen 2000), and consequently are purchased in 
quantities that are too small to meet childrens’ nutritional needs. 
This paper reports the results of a market experiment in West Africa, whose results 
suggest that much of the very high price premium currently being paid for Cérélac is due to 
consumer demand for quality information embodied in the brand name.  An independent 
sampling and testing service could provide that same quality information for other products at  
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much lower cost.  Easier access to a common quality certification “brand” would help ‘artisanal’ 
and industrial producers to enter the market using local ingredients, lowering product prices and 
helping parents meet more of their children’s nutritional needs.  We find that the demand for 
quality certification is greatest among mothers at higher income and education levels, but that 
even the very poor and uneducated would benefit from the introduction of a certification 
program.   
Any intervention in child feeding is complex and potentially controversial.  In keeping 
with the International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes (WHO 1981), foods 
intended to complement breast-milk should not be advertised or marketed for infants below 6 
months of age, and they should be accompanied by messages regarding the importance of 
continued breastfeeding beyond that age (Lutter 2002).  Given those guidelines, improving the 
quality and reducing the cost of complementary foods is a key element of the WHO/UNICEF 
Global Strategy on Infant and Young Child Feeding (WHO 2002), and quality certification for 
privately-produced products could be an important step in that direction. 
 
2. Quality information and the market for infant foods 
  The level of nutrient density needed by infants is not directly observable by consumers.  
Nutrient density is not apparent to the taste, and its effect on health is confounded by many other 
intervening factors.  A child whose growth falters may have suffered from diarrheal disease or 
intestinal parasites as well as from inadequate food intake.  It is only over a relatively large 
sample of children, controlling for disease and genetic potential, that appropriate levels of 
nutrient density can be determined.  
  Traditional infant-feeding practices take account of the special needs of infants.  Grains 
are often germinated, fermented, processed and cooked in various ways to improve digestibility, 
and mixed with oilseeds or animal products according to the availability of each ingredient 
(Haïdara 1989, 1990).  Even so, nutrient densities of typical home-prepared infant foods recently 
sampled in Africa are only 35-45 kcal/100 g. of dry matter (Bauer et al. 1997, Gerbouin-Rerolle 
and Chauliac 1996).  This is about one-tenth the density of Cérélac, and far less than what would 
be needed to avoid a nutritional constraint on child growth under any circumstances (Brown et 
al. 1998, USDA 1998). Quality Certification of Infant Foods   page  3   
  Using industrial techniques it is possible to produce appropriately high-density foods at 
extremely low cost, from cereal grains, oilseeds and sugar plus fortification with vitamins and 
minerals.  One of the most famous such products, is Incaparina, introduced in Guatemala in 1961 
(Scrimshaw 1980, Tartanac 2000).  Numerous similar initiatives have been undertaken around 
the world and across Africa (e.g. ICRISAT 1990, 1992; Porter and Shafritz 1999).   
  In Mali, the Laboratoire de Technologies Alimentaire (LTA) of the Institut d’Economie 
Rurale (IER) developed a recipe they called MILEG, whose manufacture under license to a local 
firm began in February 1995.  Although the product was placed in retail outlets, almost all sales 
were to government or donor-funded nutrition programs.  Three studies were commissioned to 
analyze the cause of limited market demand, (CECI 1996, Keita 1996, Gerbouin-Rerolle and 
Chauliac 1996), finding among other things that the original recipe was no longer being 
followed.  Production stopped in May 1997. 
  Meanwhile, a French NGO (the Association MISOLA) had begun operations in Mali, 
organizing groups of women for artisanal production using local ingredients (Bauer et al. 1997).  
And in 1997, a new food-processing firm (UCODAL) introduced a series of infant foods 
(Mariko 1999).  During 1999 and 2000, both UCODAL products and MISOLA were available 
for retail sale in at least on supermarket and one pharmacy respectively, but as with MILEG 
almost all actual sales were to government or donor nutrition programs.   
  Despite their much higher costs, imported brands continue to dominate retail markets.  
Table 1 lists the products and prices observed in Mali, by type of retail outlet.  Only the standard 
type of Nestlé’s Cérélac is available in open markets where prices are lowest.  Enclosed stores 
and pharmacies, which provide more services and charge higher mark-ups, sell other infant foods 
– but there are only two other brands, one European and one from Cote d’Ivoire, both of which 
are about as expensive as Nestlé’s.  The two low-price local products, MISOLA and UCODAL, 
attract very few buyers.  
  The dominance of high-price branded goods, even though generic substitutes are 
technically feasible and occasionally available, is a common feature of markets for goods whose 
quality cannot be observed before purchase (Nelson 1970).  The extreme case of infant foods, 
whose quality may not be known even after purchase, is known as “credence” good (Darby and Quality Certification of Infant Foods   page  4   
Karni 1973).  The value of such products must be taken on trust, and their quality is typically 
signaled by high prices, extensive advertising, or both together (Milgrom and Roberts 1986).   
  Brand identity communicates quality, but at the cost of high prices and low volumes.  
Akerlof (1970) noted that such market failures could be remedied by quality certification, using 
an independent laboratory to test the product and issue a certificate assuring consumers that the 
product will meet their needs.  Observing quality in this way is not costless, but if a testing fee is 
charged to producers, they can recover it in a higher product price from consumers, and still 
leave consumers better off than when their only source of quality information was brand identity.  
Established firms would lose some of the premium they are now earning from brand identity, as 
they and other firms would have an incentive to pay the fee, seek certification, and compete to 
provide the given quality most effectively (Crespi and Marette 2000).  In effect, the existence of 
independent certification permits the emergence of a more competitive market to provide the 
certified product.  Examples of such certification services include the work of the International 
Standards Organization (ISO) or the Underwriters’ Laboratory (UL) in the United States. 
  Although certification is a useful remedy for many market failures, establishing the 
certification “brand” involves substantial scale economies, so it is more cost-effective in larger 
markets (Auriol and Schillizi 2000).  To determine whether certification would be feasible and 
desirable, one must determine the premium consumers are willing to pay for quality information, 
and compare it to the costs of sampling, testing, and assuring consumers about product quality.   
 
3.  Consumer demand for quality certification in Mali 
This paper provides an experimental measure of Malian mothers’ willingness to pay for 
quality certification, a service which is not yet available in Mali.  We begin by establishing the 
feasibility and approximate cost of a suitable certification program.  In fact, the basic 
infrastructure needed for certification is already present.  Two public agencies have food 
laboratories equipped and staffed for testing nutrient density, one in the agricultural research 
service and one in the Ministry of Health, and there is a legal basis for using those laboratories in 
a certification program.
3   
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  The certification scheme we propose is based on a minimalist testing program, focusing 
on whether the food’s density of total protein, total energy and total fats meets a standard similar 
to the levels in Cérélac.  Tests for selected vitamins and minerals could be added if the local 
technical committee judged them necessary.  Qualities other than nutrient density, such as 
contamination or palatability can be judged by consumers, based on observable characteristics 
such as product color, texture, taste, packaging, retailer reputation and price.  If demand for 
testing proves sufficient, a certification program can operate on a voluntary fee-for-service basis, 
as long as it is offered to all potential producers (Crespi and Marette 2000).   
There is a long literature on the measurement and analysis of consumer demand for food 
quality and quality information (e.g. Wessels and Anderson 1995, Caswell 1995, Henson 1997, 
Unnevehr and Villamil 1999).  We follow the standard approach, based on the Lancaster (1966) 
model that treats each product as a bundle of distinct attributes, such as nutrients, flavor, safety 
and convenience.  Consumers’ demand for a change in product attributes can be elicited from 
market data, if there is enough variety in the attributes of products on the market, using 
“hedonic” regressions such as Van Ravenswaay and Hoehn (1991).  In our setting, certification 
is not yet being provided, so we use a market experiment to elicit preferences, as in Hayes et al. 
(1995).   
For an experiment to elicit choices similar to those made in an actual market, it is 
necessary to offer similar incentives.  The dominant approach uses a type of auction proposed by 
Vickrey (1961), in which a respondent’s bid determines whether or not they receive the product, 
but the price they must pay is determined by other respondents or by the researcher.  Such a 
design replicates consumer choices in competitive markets, where a consumer’s willingness to 
pay determines what she buys, but the price she pays is determined by other consumers’ demand 
and the cost of production.  A typical auction design asks the highest bidder to pay the second-
highest bid (e.g. Melton et al. 1996), but other designs are possible (e.g. INSEAD 2000).  The 
Vickrey concept is relatively complex, however, and requires detailed explanations and practice 
                                                                                                                                                             
Assembly in August 1992, and order-in-council N
o 92 – 235/P-RM signed by the government in December 1992.  
These directives established a Conseil National de Normalisation et de Contrôle de Qualité (CNNCQ), with a 
secretariat office in the Direction Nationale des Industries (DNI), and various technical committees. Current food 
safety controls are limited to large investment projects, which are reviewed before production begins with no 
provision for subsequent product testing, but officials and some consumers are aware that periodic random sampling 
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for respondents to learn how to place bids they will not regret.  To construct a simpler kind of 
market experiment, which uses exchange among products instead of product for money, we 
follow Binswanger (1980) and ask a sample of Malian mothers to choose among a range of 
infant foods with different attributes.  
 
4.  A market experiment to elicit demand for certification 
  The survey was conducted in Bamako in June-July 2000, at ten open-air markets 
randomly selected from the city’s shopping areas.  The sites were chosen by dividing the city 
into five similar-sized zones, and choosing two markets from each zone.  (Each zone had four or 
five significant open-air markets from which to choose.)  At each market, twenty-five mothers 
with young children were randomly selected from the shopping population, based on their time 
of arrival at the survey site.  Interactions with them were conducted in Bambara, the region’s 
home language.  Ten of the selected mothers failed to complete the entire questionnaire, for a 
final sample size of 240.   
Mothers in the survey were asked to choose between a standard 400g can of Nestlé’s 
Cérélac, two locally-processed products, and the raw ingredients needed to prepare similar foods 
at home.  The locally-processed food was a UCODAL product, repackaged in sealed plastic bags 
with a printed label marked ‘Certilac’ and figuring a healthy baby as a mark of certification.  The 
second local product was MISOLA, packed in unsealed bags with no label, which we called an 
“anonymous” or uncertified product.  The raw ingredients were cereal grains (millet, maize), 
legumes (cowpea, peanut) and sugar, in the fixed proportions recommended by Trèche (1999).  
These choices differ only in the attributes of interest:  the difference between Cérélac and 
Certilac is what is proprietary to Nestlé’s; the difference between Certilac and the anonymous 
product is quality certification, and the difference between the anonymous product and the raw 
ingredients is processing.  
Potential participants were given a brief explanation of the survey and its objective, and 
those who were to participate were seated at a table away from the crowd.  The interview
4 started 
with a short questionnaire on socio-demographic information, and then to elicit their infant-food 
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preferences respondents were given the 400 g. can of Cérélac and offered increasing quantities of 
the Certilac in exchange.  The offers were made in 100 g. increments.  So the first choice was 
between 400 g. of Cérélac vs. 400 g. of Certilac, then 400 g. vs. 500 g., followed by 400 g. vs. 
600 g., and so forth, up to a maximum of 900 g. of Certilac.  Each choice was recorded on the 
survey sheet.  As soon as the respondent accepted the Certilac, they were offered that same 
quantity of the anonymous product in exchange for it, followed by increasing quantities again in 
100 g. increments, with a maximum of four increments.  Then as soon as the anonymous product 
was accepted, the respondent was offered increasing quantities of the raw ingredients, from 4 kg 
up to 8 kg, a quantity whose market price was approximately equal to market price of the 
original can of Cérélac.  At the end of the experiment, the respondent took one of the choices 
they had made, by drawing it at random from a box.  Thus each choice was equally likely to 
determine what the participant would take home, either a can of Cérélac or something else of 
similar value.  
In effect, the experiment sets up an auction in which the respondent trades their Cérélac 
for increasing quantities of the other goods.  The data needed to calculate willingness to pay for 
each good is only the quantity of it that was needed to induce the consumer to switch.  Using that 
quantity, and the market price and quantity of Cérélac, we could solve for the respondent’s 
willingness to pay for each successive product, from the (approximate) indifference revealed by 
the consumer’s willingness to switch.  Where the first good has known price and quantity (p, q), 
we use the quantity of the other good accepted in exchange (q*) to solve for its implied price 
(p*).  If the two bundles have equal value to that consumer,  
p ·q  = p* · q*   (1) 
then the consumer’s implied price for the new good is: 
p* = p · q/q*   (2) 
and we can derive each respondent’s willingness to pay for each good from the common starting 
point of Cérélac’s well-known price (FCFA 1500) and quantity (400 g.).  Since the goods differ 
only in particular characteristics, we use the difference between the two values (p* - p) to 
determine willingness-to-pay for those characteristics.   
Our “auction” design is based on in-kind exchanges, which makes the experiment far 
simpler to explain and quicker to implement than Vickrey-type mechanisms.  And the products Quality Certification of Infant Foods   page  8   
involved are used almost exclusively for feeding infants, so the experiment is largely self-
targeting to the consumer’s preferences among infant foods.  The methodological cost of these 
advantages is that we must look outside the experiment to set the monetary measure of 
willingness to pay for each type of food.  We use the market price of Cérélac (FCFA 1500 per 
400 g. tin) because approximately 39 percent of the respondents actually buy Cérélac, implying 
that their willingness to pay for it is somewhat above that market price, and the remainder could 
probably resell the tin for a similar price if they so chose.  Using a different willingness to pay 
for the Cérélac would change the estimated willingess to pay for each other good (p* and p ), but 
not the price differences between them (p* - p), which are the variables of interest in this study. 
 
5.  Data and results 
  Descriptive statistics for the willingness-to-pay (WTP) data are given in Table 2.  (The 
complete set of underlying data, as well as the original questionnaires and photographs of the 
survey process, are available from the authors on request.)  Our principal interest is in the 
consumer’s WTP for certification, which is the difference between the anonymous and the 
certified products.  The recorded maximum difference in WTP for these two goods was 1038 
FCFA (approximately US$1.60) per 400 g. bag of food, or over two-thirds of what is paid for 
Cérélac. About only 1% of the respondents expressed no difference, or a zero willingness to pay 
for certification.  The mean WTP for certification was FCFA 455 (US$0.70), implying that the 
average mother would pay 30% of Cérélac’s price for quality information alone.  The mean WTP 
for processing was FCFA 585 (US$0.90), and for ingredients was FCFA 119 (US$0.18).  The 
gap between the price usually paid for Cérélac (FCFA 1500) and the WTP for Certilac (FCFA 
1159) represents the premium paid for higher-cost ingredients (notably skim milk powder, a 
more flavorful source of fats), higher-cost packaging (notably a resealable canister, instead of a 
plastic bag), and brand recognition.   
  The results of the experiment suggest fairly wide variation in mothers’ willingness to pay 
for quality certification, with a coefficient of variation of 55 percent.  Figure 1 shows the full 
cumulative distribution, in the sense of the proportion of respondents who traded the uncertified 
for the certified product, at each level of price difference between the two otherwise similar 
products.  Note that the distribution is nearly symmetrical, as the median (where about half Quality Certification of Infant Foods   page  9   
prefer a quality-certified to an uncertified product) occurs near the mean (at about 450 FCFA per 
bag).  Before we investigate the costs and possible net benefits of certification, we would need to 
ask whether this distribution is purely random, or whether our socioeconomic data can help 
explain respondents’ choices. 
To test for socioeconomic correlates of WTP for certification, we looked for correlations 
between respondents’ revealed WTP and their other survey responses listed in Table 3, using 
OLS regressions.  Although the WTP data are symmetrically distributed, a Shapiro–Wilk W test 
failed to prove that its distribution is normal, in either a level or log form.  But the sample size is 
small, and the distribution of sample means tends to become normal under random sampling as 
the size of the sample increases, even if the distribution in the original population is far from 
normal (Snedecor and Cochran, 1989), so we proceed with caution to use OLS on these data.  
Another particularity of the dataset is that, except for willingness to pay for processing 
(WTPPRO), all other regressors are categorical or count variables.   
The basic regression equation is: 
  i i i i site survey factors c socioecomi WTPCERT ε β β β + + + = _ _ 2 1 0  (3) 
where  1 β  is an estimated vector of coefficients on socioeconomic factors hypothesized to 
influence willingness to pay for certification.  Our data on these socioeconomic factors for each 
respondent includes their willingness to pay for processing, the labor available to produce 
complementary foods at their home, the number of children and total size of their household, 
plus the respondent’s working status, education level, use of Cerelac or other foods, and 
ownership of her home and major household appliances.  Dummy variables for each survey site 
help control for any other socioeconomic factors that are correlated with location. 
Results are shown in Table 4.  Using robust standard errors to account for 
heteroskedasticity across the survey sites, the only strongly statistically significant coefficients in 
the full model with all variables (column 1) are completion of elementary education and home 
ownership (both positive), plus four of the residence areas, which are closely linked to income 
and social status.  Clearly, higher-income and better-educated households did reveal a higher 
WTP for certification.  This is consistent with certification being a normal good, and also a 
complement to education.  There is also some significant correlation between WTP for Quality Certification of Infant Foods   page  10   
certification and WTP for processing, as households unwilling to do their own processing are 
also willing to pay more for certification, perhaps simply because they are wealthier.  
  To reduce the degrees of freedom taken up by individual neighborhood dummies, model 
2 uses the variable “suburban” to indicate residence in any of the three areas (Kalabankoro, 
Magnambougou, and Sébénikoro) remote from downtown Bamako whose inhabitants have 
similarly low income levels.  This regression also drops the secondary education variable, which 
is nonzero for only three respondents.  Results are nearly identical to model 1, but the mother 
working outside the home gains significance (and is positively correlated with WTP for 
certification).  
   A final robustness test is model 3, which includes all residence variables but only 
selected socioeconomic ones.  Their coefficients are largely unchanged, implying that the other 
socioeconomic variables are just noise, and our results are robust to their inclusion or exclusion.  
The only coefficient whose significance (but not magnitude) changes is for the use of other types 
of complementary foods, which becomes significant only when the other variables are dropped.   
  One fundamental result from our analysis is the robust importance of mother’s education 
level, and whether she works outside the home, even when controlling for total household 
income as best we can.  This result is consistent with many previous studies showing the 
influence of mother’s education and access to resources on childcare practices (Barrera, 1990; 
Alderman and Garcia, 1994).   
  Another fundamental result is that although socioeconomic status matters for WTP (our 
equation R
2 of 12-14 percent is acceptable for this kind of data), almost all mothers revealed 
WTP levels well above what we estimate are the costs of certification.  In other words, even very 
poor and uneducated mothers are unwilling to pay for anonymous products, whose quality is 
unknown.  Offering them a lower-cost way to obtain infant foods is likely to have a major impact 
on their childcare practices, and on their children’s nutritional status. 
 
6.  Costs and net benefits of certification 
  Although our work focuses on mother’s demand for certification, here we provide a 
rough budget for certification costs and an estimate of its net benefits, to establish the orders of Quality Certification of Infant Foods   page  11   
magnitude involved and assess whether it is likely that certification services could be introduced 
on a voluntary, self-financing basis.   
The establishment of a certification program would involve large fixed costs, so the 
average cost schedule depends on the number of units certified.  To locate that cost schedule, we 
assumed that only residents of Bamako would purchase certified products, so as to be 
conservative in our estimate.  From file data of the Direction Nationale de la Statistique, we 
computed that there were 49,598 children between the ages of 6 and 24 months in the city of 
Bamako in 1999.  If the average child consumes 100 g. per day (Dijkhuizen 2000), they need 
about 8 units of 400 g. per month.  To ask what proportion might consume a certified food, we 
took as our low estimate the share that now receives at least some Cérélac, and as our high 
estimate the share that now receives any kind of additional food.  From our pre-experiment 
survey, these data are 39 and 89 percent respectively, with 11 percent receiving no food other 
than breast-milk.  The result is a total potential market size between 154,746 and 353,138 units 
per month.  Note that this is only a rough estimate.  To provide a more accurate figure it would 
be necessary to conduct a survey focusing on current feeding practices, with a larger sample than 
we used for the willingness-to-pay experiments. 
  To guesstimate the costs of certification, we assumed that one unit of each thousand sold 
would be sampled, and purchased at an average cost of 220 FCFA for whatever was the smallest 
available packaging size of each kind of product.  The unit cost of testing each sample is 3,300 
FCFA, which is the current cost quoted by the Laboratoire National de la Santé for the three 
macronutrient density tests.  Indivisible staff costs were estimated to be one million FCFCA for 
each increment of 50 bags sampled per month.  Transport costs, for the staff to visit markets and 
production sites, were estimated to be 600,000 FCFA for each increment of 20 bags sampled per 
month.  And most importantly, a continuous expenditure of ten million FCFA per month was 
allotted for advertising and marketing to establish credibility.  Obviously this is by far the largest 
cost involved in a certification program, and our budget (approximately $200,000 per year) is 
ample to assure universal awareness of the certification brand throughout the target population. 
  With those data, we find that average per-unit certification costs are likely to be between 
81 and 121 FCFA per 400 g. bag, for the high and low market-size estimates respectively.  Given 
a mean WTP of FCFA 455 per 400 g., it seems very likely that a certification program could be Quality Certification of Infant Foods   page  12   
introduced, and recover its costs in user fees, while still generating large net social benefits to 
families using infant foods.  Using the smaller market-size estimate, the total economic benefit 
shared amongst families using infant foods is over FCFA 70 million per month, and total costs 
are about FCFA 19 million per month, for a net social benefit of about FCFA 51 million per 
month, or US$0.94 million per year.  Using the larger market size estimate, net social benefits 
are US$2.4 million annually.  A larger survey effort would be needed to estimate total demand 
and program impacts, but from these initial estimates it appears that introducing certification 
would generate substantial net benefits among the children most at risk of malnutrition.    
 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
  This study measures and analyzes consumer demand for quality certification of infant 
foods, using a market experiment, an associated socioeconomic survey, and a rough budget for 
the provision of certification services.  We find that mothers’ willingness to pay for quality 
information is well above the cost of introducing an independent laboratory-based sampling and 
testing service.  Introducing quality certification on a voluntary, self-financing basis is therefore 
likely to be feasible, and likely to generate a substantial improvement in child nutrition.  
  Currently, mothers are forced to choose between high-cost brands, raw ingredients 
requiring very laborious processing, and “anonymous” processed products with no brand 
recognition or quality assurance.  Effective demand for the anonymous products is very low, 
despite their low cost – and despite the fact that consumers can obtain far too little of either the 
high-cost brands or the laborious home-produced foods to meet their children’s nutritional needs.   
  Our study was motivated by the hypothesis that low effective demand for anonymous 
infant foods could be due to the unobservability of their quality, following the logic of Akerlof 
(1970).  Our market experiment provides a quantitative measure of this effect.  We find that if 
quality certification were introduced, consumers would be willing to pay (on average) an 
additional FCFA 455 (US$0.70) per 400 g. bag for the certified product over the anonymous 
product.  This is about one-third of the price currently being paid for Nestlé’s Cérélac, the 
heavily advertised branded good that dominates this market. 
  We find some link between consumers’ willingness to pay and their wealth, education, 
and employment. On average, mothers who reported that they own their home, completed Quality Certification of Infant Foods   page  13   
secondary school, or work outside the home, revealed a willingness to pay for certification that 
was 90, 80, and 40 FCFA higher than other mothers respectively.  These findings are consistent 
with the idea that better-educated mothers with more independent resources, even controlling for 
wealth, demand higher quality care for their children.  Nonetheless, even the poorest and least 
educated group of respondents revealed a willingness to pay that was well above the cost of 
providing certification.   
  In sum, the introduction of an appropriate certification program in Bamako is likely to be 
an extremely effective, well-targeted approach to improving families’ ability to meet their 
children’s nutritional needs.  Other kinds of nutrition interventions are also needed, of course – 
and would be helped by certification, which would reduce prices and increase availability of 
infant foods without using public funds.  
 Quality Certification for Infant Foods in Mali  14 
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Table 1.  Infant foods for sale in Bamako, Mali (1999) 












Cérélac (wheat)  400 g. can  1400  1500  1615 
Cérélac (wheat)  200 g. box  600    850 
Cérélac (rice)  400 g. can    1600   
Cérélac (wheat/Banana)  400 g. can    1750   
Cérélac (wheat +3 fruits)  400 g. can      2240 
Blédilac** (wheat)  250 g. can      1270 
Blédina** lactée fruits  250 g. box      1830 
Farinor** (maize/soy)  400 g. box    1690  1750 
MISOLA  500 g. bag      300*** 
UCODAL (e.g. Sinba)  200 g. bag     200***   
* In 1999, US$1.00 = 600 FCFA.  
** Farinor is a regional brand imported to Mali from Côte d’Ivoire.  Blédilac and 
Blédina are European brands.   
*** In 1999, MISOLA and UCODAL were available only from the production site, but 
in 2000 MISOLA was stocked in at least one urban pharmacy, and the UCODAL 
products in some supermarkets. 
 
Source:  Trèche (1999) for all except MISOLA and UCODAL, for which data are from 
authors’ interviews. 
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Table 2.  Summary statistics for willingness-to-pay (WTP) results  
 











WTP by product      
 Certilac  1159.83  357.77  667  1500 
 Anonymous  product  704.59  210.36  462  1500 
 Raw  ingredients  119.14  35.07  75  150 
WTP for premium         
  Certification (anon. to cert.)  455.24  251.22  0  1038 
  Processing (raw to anon.)  585.45  213.97  312  1425 
Notes:  Willingness to pay for each product is computed based on quantities exchanged 
for Cérélac, for which WTP is assumed to equal its market value (15000 FCFA). 
Market premiums are the differences in WTP between the anonymous product and 
Certilac (for certification), and between the raw ingredients and the anonymous 
product (for processing).  Using a t-test on matched samples, the 95% confidence 
intervals around the point estimates are (423, 487) and (558, 613) for certification and 
processing respectively.  
Source:  Survey data. Quality Certification for Infant Foods in Mali  19 
Table 3.  Description of variables in the regression model 
Variable Definition  Units  Mean  Std.Dev. 
WTP 
certification 
Premium paid for “Certilac” 
over anonymous product in the 
market experiment 
FCFA per bag 
(=400 g.)  455.24  251.22 
Market site  Indicator of respondent’s 
location (1 of 10 market sites). 
0/1 dummy var. 
for each area  na na 
Suburban site  = 1 if respondent’s location is 
any of three lower-income areas 
(Magnan, Same, or Sebeni).  
0/1 dummy 
variable  na na 
WTP 
processing 
Premium paid for anonymous 
product over raw ingredients in 
the market experiment 
FCFA per bag 
(=400 g.)  585.45  213.97 
Labor 
available  
Number of care-givers in the 
household able to prepare home 

















= 1 if respondent works outside 
family 
0/1 dummy 
variable  0.50 0.50 
Primary ed.   = 1 if respondent has obtained 
primary school certificate 
(“C.E.P.”) (6 years) 
0/1 dummy 
variable  0.20 0.40 
Elementary 
ed.  
= 1 if respondent has obtained 
elementary school diploma 
(“D.E.F.”) (9 years) 
0/1 dummy 
variable  0.11 0.31 
Secondary 
ed.  
= 1 if respondent has any post-
elementary school diploma 
(certificate, diploma or degree) 
0/1 dummy 
variable  0.03 0.18 
Training 
session 
= 1 if respondent attended a 
formal training session on 
complementary feeding practice 
0/1 dummy 
variable  0.48 0.50 
Uses Cérélac  = 1 if comp. foods used by 
respondent include Cérélac  
0/1 dummy 
variable  0.38 0.49 
Uses other 
foods 
= 1 if respondent uses compl. 
foods other than Cérélac  
0/1 dummy 
variable  0.51 0.50 
Owns home  = 1 if the respondent’s 
household owns their home 
0/1 dummy 
variable  0.61 0.49 
Electricity   = 1 if electricity is available in 
respondent’s home  
0/1 dummy 
variable  0.30 0.46 
Refrigerator   = 1 if a refrigerator is available 
in the respondent’s hh 
0/1 dummy 
variable  0.16 0.36 
Television   = 1 if a television is available in 
the respondent’s hh 
0/1 dummy 
variable  0.55 0.50 Quality Certification for Infant Foods in Mali  20 
 
 
Table 4.  Regression results for socioeconomic correlates of WTP  
 







     
Independent variables:     
     






     






     






     





     




     






     






     




     




     
Market site = suburban (remote/low income) 
-  -13.011 
(24.956) 
- 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 







       
Independent variables:       





       









       
Secondary education completed  -26.256 
(105.449) 
- - 
     





     





     







     









     





     





   
   















Number of observations  240 240 240 
R
2  0.14 0.12 0.13 
Note:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses, with asterisks on coefficients signifying that they differ 
from zero at significance levels of 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent (***). 
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Section 2: Consumer Choices Recording Sheet 
 
Warning!  Each respondent will win one of the 16 choices below, drawn randomly from the 16 choices.  Each choice 
represents one product. Each choice between two products must be mark with the sign ￿ in the corresponding box to 
the left of concerned quantity. Each section of the choice process starts with equal quantities of the two products, but 
quantity of the second product is progressively increased. For lot ￿ 1, respondent must choose between 400g of 
Cérélac and 400 g. of Certilac.  For lot ￿ 2 she mus choose between 400 g. of Cérélac and 500 g. of Certilac, and so 
on.  Respondent must make a choice for each lot.  
 
In section B, quantities (in bold) are not yet identified.  They depend on previous responses.  Lot ￿ 7 must contain the 
first quantity of Certilac chosen in section A.  For example, if respondent had retained Cérélac for lots ￿ 1, 2, 3 et 4, 
followed by Certilac for lots ￿ 5 et 6 (800 g. et 900 g. respectively), lot ￿ 7 would consist of 800 g of Certilac or 800 
g. of the unknown product.  Lots ￿ 8, 9, 10 and 11 would be composed of 800 of Certilac always, but the quantity of 
the unknown product would increase: lot ￿ 8 would contain 900 g., lot ￿ 9, 1000 g., lot ￿ 10, 1100 g., and lot ￿ 11, 
1200 g.   
 
For section C, the quantity of the unknown product starts with its first quantity chosen in section B, but quantity of the 
bundle of raw ingredients start with 4000 g. and is always increased by 1000g after each choice by respondent up to a 
maximum quantity of 8000g. 
 
Section A.  Choice between the imported brand (Cérélac) and the certified local product (Certilac) 
Choices started with equal quantities of Cérélac and Certilac. 
Lot ￿ 1    400 g. Cérélac     400 g. Certilac 
Lot ￿ 2    400 g. Cérélac      500 g. Certilac 
Lot ￿ 3    400 g. Cérélac      600 g. Certilac 
Lot ￿ 4    400 g. Cérélac      700 g. Certilac 
Lot ￿ 5    400 g. Cérélac      800 g. Certilac 
Lot ￿ 6    400 g. Cérélac      900 g. Certilac 
               
Section B.  Choice between Certilac and the uncertified local product (Unknown Product) 
Complete bold numbers, using the first quantity of Certilac chosen in section A.  
Lot ￿ 7    __ 00 g. Certilac      __ 00 g. Unknown Product 
Lot ￿ 8    __ 00 g. Certilac      __ 00 g. Unknown Product 
Lot ￿ 9    __ 00 g. Certilac      __ 00 g. Unknown Product 
Lot ￿ 10    __ 00 g. Certilac      __ 00 g. Unknown Product 
Lot ￿ 11    __ 00 g. Certilac      __ 00 g. Unknown Product 
               
Section C.  Choice between Unknown Product and package of raw grains 
Complete bold numbers, using the first quantity of Unknown Product chosen in section B. Quantity of the package of 
raw grains starts at 4000g, and is increased by increment of 1000g until the maximum quantity of 8000g which value is 
equivalent to the average price of a-400g-can of Cérélac. 
Lot ￿ 12    __ 00 g. Unknown Product      4000 g. Raw Grains 
Lot ￿ 13    __ 00 g. Unknown Product      5000 g. Raw Grains 
Lot ￿ 14    __ 00 g. Unknown Product      6000 g. Raw Grains 
Lot ￿ 15    __ 00 g. Unknown Product      7000 g. Raw Grains 
Lot ￿ 16    __ 00 g. Unknown Product       8000 g. Raw Grains 
 
 